书名: Aristotle's Theory of Moral Insight
作者: Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Author)
出版社: Oxford University Press(UK) (June 30, 1983)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0198246676
ISBN-13: 978-0198246671
电子书格式：DJVU, 推荐查看工具：WinDjView
Book Review by A. W. H. Adkins, University of Chicago, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 23:4 (1985:Oct.)
The author of this densely written and closely argued book distinguishes between the philosophical and scholarly approaches to Aristotle, presents himself as a scholar, and modestly states (viii) that "the latter type of work will necessarily be only second-best." He locates himself in the Anglo-American tradition of Aristotelian interpretation as represented by D. J. Allan (on the more scholarly wing), J. L. Austin and G. E. M. Anscombe (on the more philosophical wing), and their respective successors.
Engberg-Pedersen divides his work into two parts. The first, consisting of four chapters entitled "Eudaimonia and Praxis," "Morality," "The Virtues," and "Human Good," creates the context in which the even more detailed discussions of the second part, entitled "The Psychology: Passions and Reason," "Moral Insight and Desire," "Moral Insight and Deliberation," "The Point of Moral Insight," "Moral Insight and Responsibility," and a general conclusion, may be conducted. (There is little or no discussion of the Mean, the practical syllogism, or akrasia.)
Neither the discussions nor the conclusion are innocent of philosophy. The au- thor relates his view of Aristotle and his moral psychology to the later philosophical tradition. It is Humean rather than anti-Humean (with important qualifications), Kantian rather than Hegelian, not deontological while avoiding the criticisms of the deontologist. Engberg-Pedersen, in denying that his book is philosophical in ap- proach, is claiming to contribute "some new and indisputable information.., from the painstaking analysis of passages which have already been painstakingly com- mented on" (ix).
That such analysis is scholarly would be difficult to deny. The author carries it out with the utmost thoughtfulness. The book argues for many interpretations which are worth taking very seriously indeed; an adequate discussion would require another book of comparable length to Engberg-Pedersen's work. However, there are other questions, equally scholarly and equally relevant, which find no place here, or, it must be admitted, in many other scholarly approaches to Greek ethics. There are scholarly skills which are as relevant to the interpretation of a Greek philosopher as to the interpretation of a historian or a lyric poet. The scholar should establish so far as possible what the Greek means; not in the sense of being able to produce an English near-equivalent which fits quite well the passage being read, but in the sense of understanding how the word was used by the ancient Greeks, who had not the advantage of speaking English. Like Thucydides or Pindar, Aristotle spoke and wrote Greek, and in his moral philosophy he naturally made much use of value- terms, not all of which are defined in his text, and most of which have a long previous history. Even when a philosopher defines a term which is already in use, it is very difficult to exclude connotations derived from earlier usage; where no definition is offered, such exclusion becomes impossible. I am not making the absurd claim that the meanings of words do not change, merely that words trail clouds of connota- tions behind them. On a number of occasions Engberg-Pedersen inquires why Aristotle should have taken the position he does, and sometimes offers no answer. Sometimes the answer lies outside Aristotle, in the earlier history of Greek values. The author discusses no Greek writer earlier than Aristotle, and only three later authors (passages from Cicero, Menander, and Plutarch, all in footnotes). He is at liberty to reply that Aristotle's thought was totally independent of its historical context. This belief is not unknown among philosophers and political theorists, but it should be less attractive to classical scholars. But even were Engberg-Pedersen to reply thus, it seems indefensible for him to treat Aristotle's ethical thought as independent independent of its Aristotelian context. He bases his discussions primarily on the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics and the De Anima, and assumes without argument an identity of doctrine in all three works. The assumption is debatable; but if it be granted, the virtually complete absence of the Politics from the book-three references in footnotes-is very difficult to defend. Both as a scholar and as a philosopher, Engberg-Pedersen must be aware that Greek ethics down to the death of Aristotle is polis-ethics; and even if his scholarly and philosophical interests were confined to Aristotle, there are many cross-references between the Ethics and Politics, and the value-terms and presuppositions are the same in both. Even if some students of Aristotle were to dispute the last claim, Engberg-Pedersen cannot do so without evident inconsistency.
In fact, despite his scholarship, Engberg-Pedersen brings a modern outlook to his discussion of ancient values. He distinguishes ethics from politics, and gives a higher status to ethics. His novel attempt to solve the problem of the relationship between theoria and praxis in Aristotle includes the claim that the theoretikos and the praktikos are both abstractions. Aristotle says that one cannot engage constantly in theoria; Engberg-Pedersen adds (109):"And while it might be possible for someone to do nothing but engage in the life of a politician, we shall see that it would hardly be possible for anyone to do nothing but act morally well, and it is this kind of life, which is different from that of a politician, that Aristotle describes as being secondarily eudaimon." But in the context of this very description, Aristotle writes (NE X, 1177b16):"and if of praxeis in accordance with arete"-the subject-matter of most of the Ethics-"the political and warlike ones are surpassing in kallos"-the noun corresponding to the adjective kalon, for the sake of which truly moral actions are performed-"and importance, but are lacking in leisure and aim at some further end and are not chosen for their own sake," this life affords only a secondary eudaimonia. The life is explicitly political, and it uses Aristotle's most important ethical terms. Ethics and politics employ the same range of terms, and politics is more important-and more kalon-than ethical behavior in private life. There is no warrant in general for not reading the Politics with the Ethics; and given the author's insistence on the importance of the kalon in Aristotle's ethical thought, even less warrant for his ignoring Aristotle's political views. Arete, the kalon, and phronesis, terms of fundamental importance both in Aristotle's view of moral insight and in the author's discussion of Aristotle, are no less important in the Politics; and when they are used and discussed in their appropriate context-the polis, and in particular the best polis of the last two books of the Politics-much becomes clear that is puzzling if the Ethics is read in isolation. If we take into account the way of life of the citizens of the best polis, and remember that the arete of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man (Politics 1333a11), and that human beings have the same goal individually and in common, so that the definition of the best man and the best constitution must be the same, the function of phronesis in Aristotle's ethicopolitical thought will become clearer.
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作者: Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Author)
出版社: Oxford University Press(UK) (June 30, 1983)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0198246676
ISBN-13: 978-0198246671
电子书格式：DJVU, 推荐查看工具：WinDjView
Book Review by A. W. H. Adkins, University of Chicago, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 23:4 (1985:Oct.)
The author of this densely written and closely argued book distinguishes between the philosophical and scholarly approaches to Aristotle, presents himself as a scholar, and modestly states (viii) that "the latter type of work will necessarily be only second-best." He locates himself in the Anglo-American tradition of Aristotelian interpretation as represented by D. J. Allan (on the more scholarly wing), J. L. Austin and G. E. M. Anscombe (on the more philosophical wing), and their respective successors.
Engberg-Pedersen divides his work into two parts. The first, consisting of four chapters entitled "Eudaimonia and Praxis," "Morality," "The Virtues," and "Human Good," creates the context in which the even more detailed discussions of the second part, entitled "The Psychology: Passions and Reason," "Moral Insight and Desire," "Moral Insight and Deliberation," "The Point of Moral Insight," "Moral Insight and Responsibility," and a general conclusion, may be conducted. (There is little or no discussion of the Mean, the practical syllogism, or akrasia.)
Neither the discussions nor the conclusion are innocent of philosophy. The au- thor relates his view of Aristotle and his moral psychology to the later philosophical tradition. It is Humean rather than anti-Humean (with important qualifications), Kantian rather than Hegelian, not deontological while avoiding the criticisms of the deontologist. Engberg-Pedersen, in denying that his book is philosophical in ap- proach, is claiming to contribute "some new and indisputable information.., from the painstaking analysis of passages which have already been painstakingly com- mented on" (ix).
That such analysis is scholarly would be difficult to deny. The author carries it out with the utmost thoughtfulness. The book argues for many interpretations which are worth taking very seriously indeed; an adequate discussion would require another book of comparable length to Engberg-Pedersen's work. However, there are other questions, equally scholarly and equally relevant, which find no place here, or, it must be admitted, in many other scholarly approaches to Greek ethics. There are scholarly skills which are as relevant to the interpretation of a Greek philosopher as to the interpretation of a historian or a lyric poet. The scholar should establish so far as possible what the Greek means; not in the sense of being able to produce an English near-equivalent which fits quite well the passage being read, but in the sense of understanding how the word was used by the ancient Greeks, who had not the advantage of speaking English. Like Thucydides or Pindar, Aristotle spoke and wrote Greek, and in his moral philosophy he naturally made much use of value- terms, not all of which are defined in his text, and most of which have a long previous history. Even when a philosopher defines a term which is already in use, it is very difficult to exclude connotations derived from earlier usage; where no definition is offered, such exclusion becomes impossible. I am not making the absurd claim that the meanings of words do not change, merely that words trail clouds of connota- tions behind them. On a number of occasions Engberg-Pedersen inquires why Aristotle should have taken the position he does, and sometimes offers no answer. Sometimes the answer lies outside Aristotle, in the earlier history of Greek values. The author discusses no Greek writer earlier than Aristotle, and only three later authors (passages from Cicero, Menander, and Plutarch, all in footnotes). He is at liberty to reply that Aristotle's thought was totally independent of its historical context. This belief is not unknown among philosophers and political theorists, but it should be less attractive to classical scholars. But even were Engberg-Pedersen to reply thus, it seems indefensible for him to treat Aristotle's ethical thought as independent independent of its Aristotelian context. He bases his discussions primarily on the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics and the De Anima, and assumes without argument an identity of doctrine in all three works. The assumption is debatable; but if it be granted, the virtually complete absence of the Politics from the book-three references in footnotes-is very difficult to defend. Both as a scholar and as a philosopher, Engberg-Pedersen must be aware that Greek ethics down to the death of Aristotle is polis-ethics; and even if his scholarly and philosophical interests were confined to Aristotle, there are many cross-references between the Ethics and Politics, and the value-terms and presuppositions are the same in both. Even if some students of Aristotle were to dispute the last claim, Engberg-Pedersen cannot do so without evident inconsistency.
In fact, despite his scholarship, Engberg-Pedersen brings a modern outlook to his discussion of ancient values. He distinguishes ethics from politics, and gives a higher status to ethics. His novel attempt to solve the problem of the relationship between theoria and praxis in Aristotle includes the claim that the theoretikos and the praktikos are both abstractions. Aristotle says that one cannot engage constantly in theoria; Engberg-Pedersen adds (109):"And while it might be possible for someone to do nothing but engage in the life of a politician, we shall see that it would hardly be possible for anyone to do nothing but act morally well, and it is this kind of life, which is different from that of a politician, that Aristotle describes as being secondarily eudaimon." But in the context of this very description, Aristotle writes (NE X, 1177b16):"and if of praxeis in accordance with arete"-the subject-matter of most of the Ethics-"the political and warlike ones are surpassing in kallos"-the noun corresponding to the adjective kalon, for the sake of which truly moral actions are performed-"and importance, but are lacking in leisure and aim at some further end and are not chosen for their own sake," this life affords only a secondary eudaimonia. The life is explicitly political, and it uses Aristotle's most important ethical terms. Ethics and politics employ the same range of terms, and politics is more important-and more kalon-than ethical behavior in private life. There is no warrant in general for not reading the Politics with the Ethics; and given the author's insistence on the importance of the kalon in Aristotle's ethical thought, even less warrant for his ignoring Aristotle's political views. Arete, the kalon, and phronesis, terms of fundamental importance both in Aristotle's view of moral insight and in the author's discussion of Aristotle, are no less important in the Politics; and when they are used and discussed in their appropriate context-the polis, and in particular the best polis of the last two books of the Politics-much becomes clear that is puzzling if the Ethics is read in isolation. If we take into account the way of life of the citizens of the best polis, and remember that the arete of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man (Politics 1333a11), and that human beings have the same goal individually and in common, so that the definition of the best man and the best constitution must be the same, the function of phronesis in Aristotle's ethicopolitical thought will become clearer.
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