【英语】 黑格尔的自然主义：心智、自然与生命的终极目的 2012-07-15

书名: Hegel's Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life
作者: Terry Pinkard (Author)
出版社: Oxford University Press, USA (January 23, 2012)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0199860793
ISBN-13: 978-0199860791
电子书格式：DJVU, 推荐查看工具：WinDjView

Book Description

• No book has treated Hegel's concept of being-at-one-with-oneself in this depth
• No book has argued for Hegel as being an Aristotelian naturalist in this fashion.
• The author advances the view that Hegel's conception of the nature of philosophy bears a passing similarity to that of Wittgenstein's, in that both think that the kinds of conceptual puzzles that animate philosophy are fundamentally irresolvable, even though Hegel argues for a much different social role for philosophy than does Wittgenstein.

Terry Pinkard draws on Hegel's central works as well as his lectures on aesthetics, the history of philosophy, and the philosophy of history in this deeply informed and original exploration of Hegel's naturalism. As Pinkard explains, Hegel's version of naturalism was in fact drawn from Aristotelian naturalism: Hegel fused Aristotle's conception of nature with his insistence that the origin and development of philosophy has empirical physics as its presupposition. As a result, Hegel found that, although modern nature must be understood as a whole to be non-purposive, there is nonetheless a place for Aristotelian purposiveness within such nature. Such a naturalism provides the framework for explaining how we are both natural organisms and also practically minded (self-determining, rationally responsive, reason-giving) beings. In arguing for this point, Hegel shows that the kind of self-division which is characteristic of human agency also provides human agents with an updated version of an Aristotelian final end of life.

Pinkard treats this conception of the final end of "being at one with oneself" in two parts. The first part focuses on Hegel's account of agency in naturalist terms and how it is that agency requires such a self-division, while the second part explores how Hegel thinks a historical narration is essential for understanding what this kind of self-division has come to require of itself. In making his case, Hegel argues that both the antinomies of philosophical thought and the essential fragmentation of modern life are all not to be understood as overcome in a higher order unity in the "State." On the contrary, Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions do not resolve such tensions any more than a comprehensive philosophical account can resolve them theoretically. The job of modern practices and institutions (and at a reflective level the task of modern philosophy) is to help us understand and live with precisely the unresolvability of these oppositions. Therefore, Pinkard explains, Hegel is not the totality theorist he has been taken to be, nor is he an "identity thinker," à la Adorno. He is an anti-totality thinker.

Readership: Advanced undergraduates, graduate students, scholars with an interest in this area (not just philosophers) and some areas of the general public that like reading philosophy books.

About the Author
Terry Pinkard is Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University; author of German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism, Hegel: A Biography and Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason; and editor of Heinrich Heine on the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany.

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