名称 Modern Individuality in Hegel's Practical Philosophy
作者 Erzsébet Rózsa 译者:Tamás Nyirkos
出版商 BRILL
页数 312 页
In "Modern Individuality in Hegel s Practical Philosophy," Erzs bet R zsa aims to reconstruct Hegel s theory of individuality in the light of his idea of modernity. Modern individuality is one of the central topics of Hegel s practical philosophy, discussed systematically in the forms of subjectivity in subjective, objective, and practical spirit. Hegel interpreted modern existence and lifeworld in the context of law, politics, economy, and private life. Infinite subjective freedom is the historical principle of the modern age, as well as the basic determination of modern individual forms of existence and knowledge. Modern form of life and mentality based on the values and practical actions of self-konwledge and self-determination is an achievement of historical significance. This radical turn, however, gives a new perspective to the problem of good life: the normative role of substantial values is overshadowed by the stabilizatory function of the objective order of institutions.
作者 Erzsébet Rózsa 译者:Tamás Nyirkos
出版商 BRILL
页数 312 页
In "Modern Individuality in Hegel s Practical Philosophy," Erzs bet R zsa aims to reconstruct Hegel s theory of individuality in the light of his idea of modernity. Modern individuality is one of the central topics of Hegel s practical philosophy, discussed systematically in the forms of subjectivity in subjective, objective, and practical spirit. Hegel interpreted modern existence and lifeworld in the context of law, politics, economy, and private life. Infinite subjective freedom is the historical principle of the modern age, as well as the basic determination of modern individual forms of existence and knowledge. Modern form of life and mentality based on the values and practical actions of self-konwledge and self-determination is an achievement of historical significance. This radical turn, however, gives a new perspective to the problem of good life: the normative role of substantial values is overshadowed by the stabilizatory function of the objective order of institutions.
