书名: Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
作者: Daron Acemoglu (Author), James A. Robinson (Author)
出版社: Cambridge University Press (December 19, 2005)
语言：English
ISBN-10: 0521855268
ISBN-13: 978-0521855266
Book Description
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.
Review
"This path-breaking book is among the most ambitious, innovative, sweeping, and rigorous scholarly efforts in comparative political economy and political development. It offers a broad, substantial new account of the creation and consolidation of democracy. Why is the franchise extended? How do elites make reform believable and avoid expropriation? Why do revolutions nevertheless occur? Why do new democracies sometimes collapse into coups and repression? When is repression abandoned? Backed by a unified analytic model, historical insight, and extensive statistical analysis, the authors' case is compelling." --James E. Alt, Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government, Harvard University
"Sociologists are given a new template about class interactions in the political sphere, one that suggests both new tests and new ideas. And comparative historians, while fleeing from active involvement in game theory, have a new set of conjectures to support or be provoked by." --Peter Lindert, University of California, Davis
"Acemoglu and Robinson have developed a coherent and flexible analytical framework that brings together many aspects of the comparative political economy of democratization and democratic consolidation. Beyond being an excellent work of synthesis, this framework also leads to insights that will pave the way for further theoretical and empirical investigation. The combination of theory and historical application make this a first-rate book for teaching, as well as a major research contribution." --Thomas Romer, Princeton University
"This book is an immense achievement. Acemoglu and Robinson at once extend the frontiers of both economics and political science; they provide a new way of understanding why some countries are rich and some are poor; and they reinterpret the last 500 years of history." --Barry Weingast, Stanford University
"A vast body of research in social science on the development of democracy offers detailed accounts of specific country events but few general lessons. Acemoglu and Robinson breathe new life into this field. Relying on a sequence of formal but parsimonious game-theoretic models and on penetrating historical analysis, they provide a common understanding of the diverse country histories observed during the last two centuries" --Torsten Persson, Director Institute for International Economics Studies, Stockholm University
"I expect Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy to be highly influential…Acemoglu and Robinson will deservedly win an audience. Students of economics will study this text as much for its methodical exposition and academic proofs as for its conclusions. They will find the effort well worthwhile." --Financial Times, FT Magazine
"Acemoglu and Robinson have dared to set themselves up as targets. It is unlikely that the naysayers and nitpickers will be able to desist. Nor should they. And if the authors' effort survives the pounding—as well it might—it will be a triumph not just for Acemoglu and Robinson but for economics and its methods." --Arvind Subramanian, International Monetary Fund Journal
"I would recommend this book to anyone with a serious interest in democratic transitions and economic development. Its historical scope, and the power of the models it develops, set a new standard in political economy." --Michael Munger, EH.NET
"In this superb volume, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, seek to answer age old questions in political economy...Their answers, and the manner in which they were obtained, are refreshingly new." --Roman Wacziarg, Science
About the Author
Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Economic Growth program of the Canadian Institute of Advanced Research. He is also affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research, Center for Economic Performance, and Center for Economic Policy Research, and is a Fellow of the European Economic Association. Professor Acemoglu previously taught at the London School of Economics. He received the award for best paper published in the Economic Journal in 1996 for his paper ‘Consumer Confidence and Rational Expectations: Are Agents’ Beliefs Consistent with the Theory?’, the inaugural T. W. Shultz Prize at the University of Chicago in 2004, and the inaugural Sherwin Rosen award for outstanding contribution to labor economics in 2004. Professor Acemoglu is the Editor of the eminent journal Review of Economics and Statistics, and Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He previously taught at the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Southern California, and the University of Melbourne. A 2002 Carnegie Scholar and Hoover Institution Fellow for 1999–2000, his research has been published in leading journals such as the Quarterly Journal of Economics, American Economic Review, American Political Science Review, and the Journal of Economic Literature. Together with Professors Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Professor Robinson is coauthor of the forthcoming book, The Institutional Roots of Prosperity.
[thread=8819]论坛相关讨论主题[/thread]
作者: Daron Acemoglu (Author), James A. Robinson (Author)
出版社: Cambridge University Press (December 19, 2005)
语言：English
ISBN-10: 0521855268
ISBN-13: 978-0521855266
Book Description
This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.
Review
"This path-breaking book is among the most ambitious, innovative, sweeping, and rigorous scholarly efforts in comparative political economy and political development. It offers a broad, substantial new account of the creation and consolidation of democracy. Why is the franchise extended? How do elites make reform believable and avoid expropriation? Why do revolutions nevertheless occur? Why do new democracies sometimes collapse into coups and repression? When is repression abandoned? Backed by a unified analytic model, historical insight, and extensive statistical analysis, the authors' case is compelling." --James E. Alt, Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government, Harvard University
"Sociologists are given a new template about class interactions in the political sphere, one that suggests both new tests and new ideas. And comparative historians, while fleeing from active involvement in game theory, have a new set of conjectures to support or be provoked by." --Peter Lindert, University of California, Davis
"Acemoglu and Robinson have developed a coherent and flexible analytical framework that brings together many aspects of the comparative political economy of democratization and democratic consolidation. Beyond being an excellent work of synthesis, this framework also leads to insights that will pave the way for further theoretical and empirical investigation. The combination of theory and historical application make this a first-rate book for teaching, as well as a major research contribution." --Thomas Romer, Princeton University
"This book is an immense achievement. Acemoglu and Robinson at once extend the frontiers of both economics and political science; they provide a new way of understanding why some countries are rich and some are poor; and they reinterpret the last 500 years of history." --Barry Weingast, Stanford University
"A vast body of research in social science on the development of democracy offers detailed accounts of specific country events but few general lessons. Acemoglu and Robinson breathe new life into this field. Relying on a sequence of formal but parsimonious game-theoretic models and on penetrating historical analysis, they provide a common understanding of the diverse country histories observed during the last two centuries" --Torsten Persson, Director Institute for International Economics Studies, Stockholm University
"I expect Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy to be highly influential…Acemoglu and Robinson will deservedly win an audience. Students of economics will study this text as much for its methodical exposition and academic proofs as for its conclusions. They will find the effort well worthwhile." --Financial Times, FT Magazine
"Acemoglu and Robinson have dared to set themselves up as targets. It is unlikely that the naysayers and nitpickers will be able to desist. Nor should they. And if the authors' effort survives the pounding—as well it might—it will be a triumph not just for Acemoglu and Robinson but for economics and its methods." --Arvind Subramanian, International Monetary Fund Journal
"I would recommend this book to anyone with a serious interest in democratic transitions and economic development. Its historical scope, and the power of the models it develops, set a new standard in political economy." --Michael Munger, EH.NET
"In this superb volume, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, seek to answer age old questions in political economy...Their answers, and the manner in which they were obtained, are refreshingly new." --Roman Wacziarg, Science
About the Author
Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Economic Growth program of the Canadian Institute of Advanced Research. He is also affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research, Center for Economic Performance, and Center for Economic Policy Research, and is a Fellow of the European Economic Association. Professor Acemoglu previously taught at the London School of Economics. He received the award for best paper published in the Economic Journal in 1996 for his paper ‘Consumer Confidence and Rational Expectations: Are Agents’ Beliefs Consistent with the Theory?’, the inaugural T. W. Shultz Prize at the University of Chicago in 2004, and the inaugural Sherwin Rosen award for outstanding contribution to labor economics in 2004. Professor Acemoglu is the Editor of the eminent journal Review of Economics and Statistics, and Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Growth. James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He previously taught at the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Southern California, and the University of Melbourne. A 2002 Carnegie Scholar and Hoover Institution Fellow for 1999–2000, his research has been published in leading journals such as the Quarterly Journal of Economics, American Economic Review, American Political Science Review, and the Journal of Economic Literature. Together with Professors Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Professor Robinson is coauthor of the forthcoming book, The Institutional Roots of Prosperity.
[thread=8819]论坛相关讨论主题[/thread]
