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书名: Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (OXFORD COGNITIVE SCIENCE SERIES)
作者: Jerry A. Fodor (Author)
出版社: Oxford University Press, USA; 1 edition (March 11, 1998)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0198236360
ISBN-13: 978-0198236368
Book Description
The Oxford Cognitive Science series is a forum for the best contemporary work in this flourishing field, where various disciplines--cognitive psychology, philosophy, linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and computational theory--join forces in the investigation of thought, awareness, understanding, and associated workings of the mind. Each book will represent an original contribution to its subject, but will be accessible beyond the ranks of specialists, so as to reach a broad interdisciplinary readership. The series will be carefully shaped and steered by the general editors, with the aim of representing the most important developments in the field and bringing together its constituent disciplines. About this book The renowned philosopher Jerry Fodor, who has been a leading figure in the study of the mind for more than twenty years, presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, deals out witty and pugnacious demolitions of the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years, and suggests that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. This lively, conversational, and surprisingly accessible book is the first volume in the Oxford Cognitive Science Series, where the best original work in this field will be presented to a broad readership. Concepts will fascinate anyone interested in contemporary work on mind and language. Cognitive science will never be the same again.
Review
`serves up plenty of clever barbs, potshots, and one-liners' -- The Philosophical Review, Vol.109, No.4
`immensely stimulating. Anyone working in the area will need to study its trenchant critical discussion of key positions in philosophy, linguistics, and psychology. These readers will be rewarded as well by the book's many illuminating asides and its more constructive closing chapters.' -- Steven Gross
`a rich account of what a science of the mind might look like if concepts had no structure ... a daunting critique of much of contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. Like most of Fodor's work, this book is bound to infuriate some and delight others. Either way it is full of interesting arguments, and as Fodor's most comprehensive overview of his philosophical position in years, his new book deserves to be - and surely will be - widely read.' -- British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 50 (1999)
`Fodor continues to be one of philosophy's great idea generators. This provocative book will set the agenda for discussion about concepts for years to come. Fodor argues for atomism about concepts with wit, verve and style. Everyone interested in philosophical issues of language or mind should study this book.' -- Ned Block, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology, New York University
About the Author
Jerry Fodor is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey.
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