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书名: The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind (International Library of Philosophy)
作者: John Foster (Author)
出版社: Routledge; 1 edition (December 10, 1996)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0415156335
ISBN-13: 978-0415156332
Book Description
Dualism is a doctrine engaged on two fronts. It affirms a thesis about the mind, in opposition to various forms of materialism and mental reductionism, and a thesis about the physical world, in opposition to various forms of mentalism and idealism. The Immaterial Self examines a dualist account of the mind, a defence of the Cartesian account in which the immaterial contents of the mind are assigned to an immaterial mental subject. Foster vigorously attacks alternative accounts of the mind--both those, like functionalism and the identity theories, which are opposed to dualism as such, and those which accept dualism in a Humean (non-Cartesian) form. In its final sections, the book develops positive accounts of the attachment of the self to the body, its power of free agency, and its role in personal identity.
Review
'This is a lucid, powerful and well-constructed book.' -- N.M.L Nathan, MIND
'Anyone interested in the current state of the debate should enjoy John Foster's careful and comprehensive treatment of the issues.' -- Times Literary Supplement
'This valuable book can be thought of as the Counter-reformation of Cartesian Dualism. For the first time, I think, a philosopher skilled in contemporary analytical techniques, and informed by analytical scruplousness in argument, has undertaken a full scale defense of the view that the mind is immaterial substance. Whatever our views about the mind, we must all be better off.' -- D.M. Armstorng, Philosophical Review
About the Author
John Foster is Fellow and Tutor of Philosophy, Brasenose College, Oxford.
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