cjtramell
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[Developing...]
A couple advices before you decide to read this not so short note. First, this is a reading note and therefore I am unable to know ex ante Heidegger's response. If you have completed Being and Time, this note might be of little help to you. You might find in later chapters Heidegger has written compelling arguments against my criticism. I will however reconsider these comments as I move along the book and I will put these revisionary thoughts in brackets next to the original comments.
Second, I will at times utilize Hegel's nomenclature when I see fit. Familiarize yourself with Hegel's Phenomenology is helpful to understand my Notes and more importantly Being and Time. I haven't read Heidegger's critique on Phenomenology, so by employing Hegel I have primed myself with Hegellian predispositions that Heidegger might be against. However, since I am reading both interchangeably, I think it is heuristically plausible to contrast them for my own synthesis.
Heidegger's Synopsis
Heidegger's own outline is helpful to grasp the big picture of his project and is hence reproduced without minor adjustment.
Introduction
A side note of Heidegger's terminology before we dig deep into the brilliant introduction.
Sec. Int. I
What is the meaning of being? This is the core question motivating the writing of Being and Time. The most important thing in this part is of course Heidegger's contextualization of the understanding of being and how Dasein fit in the big picture. The justification for the importance of the question as well as the call for a formal structure of the question of being are self-explanatory. What is really noteworthy is Heidegger's abstraction of Dasein.
So what is Dasein? (p. 10) Once we ask ourselves the question, we immediately realize the tension within it, for "is" predicts the understanding of the being of Dasein? This sounds much like a contradiction: Dasein, by our construction, is a being of beings, without a proper understanding of being, how do we make sense of the question that asks for the being of a being? However, this objection is exactly to the point but not so much an objection. For Dasein is merely ontic at the beginning of our investigation; it is the ordinary everyday understanding of the ways human beings behave. Therefore, the question asks for the determinate meaning of being of Dasein is an understanding of Dasein, for "[t]he ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological."
Let's do remind ourselves that Dasein is merely an exemplary being. While the understanding thereof takes ontic-ontological priority, it is no substitution for the understanding of being. We will need to return to the motivational question once we grasp the essence of Dasein.
Sec. Int. II
Here Heidegger introduces the idea of preontological between ontic and ontological. This distinction is awkward but necessary. Inwood has a remarkable exegesis of the concept:
For Dasein is merely the Immediate impression of being, it is necessarily temporal. This leads us to a doubt of Heidegger's method. For any of our conclusions of Time is caused by the temporal existence of Dasein. Yet Time is ontically a being, how could Heidegger treat Being and Time as two different and fixed ontological entities? Are we mislead by a wrong exemplar being? This doubt is justified but does not cause a problem for our inquiry. As we have argued that our analysis of Dasein is necessitated by its ontic-ontological priority, we are prepared to accept such misconceptions. This is another reason to make a transcendental move from Dasein to being, once we have completed our analysis of Dasein.
After a brief introduction of the idea of Dasein as a being-in-time, Heidegger seems to get himself carried away by his own brilliance. He takes the order to criticize Aristotle, Bergson, Descartes and Kant and finally comes to a critique of phenomenology. However, Heidegger's discussion of phenomenology is superficial; it doesn't touch on the necessity of dialectical phenomenology.
Heidegger argues there is possibility that things show "themselves as they are not in themselves." (p. 29) However, this is merely a fanciful Abstract. The in-itself emanates all its appearances from itself; all phenomena of it, the for-an-others of this in-itself, consequently inherit the same in-itself. Heidegger's misconception is rooted in his confusion of dialectic as the necessary course of consciousness to realize itself. He fancifully assumes that he could start from the other end of the chain. However, this assumptions is merely a concoction of consciousness. The in-itself, assuming consciousness stumbles upon it, exists first for consciousness merely as an ordinary phenomena.
To see this erroneous understanding clearly, let's consider Heidegger's example of "appearances or symptoms of illness." He argues, "What is meant by this are occurrences in the body that show themselves and in this self-showing as such 'indicate' something that does not show itself." (p.25) The appearances are symptoms; the in-itself of the appearances is by construction not illness. Heidegger thinks by this he has come up with an example where appearances come from the thing that is not in-itself. However, the appearances of illness, if not coming from illness, must come from some place else; we can call this the source. The source is the in-itself of the appearances; illness is merely an irrelevant semblance. As consciousness works from such appearances, it realizes the appearances come from the source, its in-self, which is not illness. Hence, Heidegger's example cannot stand.
Heidegger takes a wrong turn but nonetheless arrives at my position. "Ontology is possible only as phenomenology." (p. 51) The discussion of logos, albeit interesting, is unnecessary; it complicates otherwise more lucid reasoning. I agree with the theorization of the phenomenology as hermeneutics. In fact, I have proposed earlier elsewhere the parallels of phonomenolgy and the linguistic procedure of providing a definition.
A last word before I end my note on the introduction. Since Time is a big issue for Heidegger, I will discuss it in detail in the coming sections. However, Heidegger's introduction of being in time up to this point is quite mundane, for the essence of being as Hegel demonstrated is becoming. Hence, being has already incorporated time in itself. Does this completely reject time as a different ontological entity from being? I am not sure. But I'll certainly think more about it as I move into the next a few parts. Heidegger has established himself as a gifted writer, the best I have ever read in term of clarity, and a lucid thinker, but there is nothing groundbreaking up to now.
Outline. Ch. 1 sets up the preparatory existential analytic of Dasein. Ch. 2 analyzes the structure of being-in-the-world. Ch. 3 deals with the world in its worldliness. The remaining chapters talk about being-in-the-world as being a self and being with others (ch. 4), being-in as such (ch. 5) and the existential meaning in care (ch. 6). Remember the existential is merely the a priori, the in-itself of the existentiell.
Ch. 1.
"The 'essence' o this being lies in its to be." (p. 39) Unclear; translator has it: that it has to be. Also true: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence." (p. 40, emphasis removed) He begins to anthropomorphize Dasein. Phenomenology is reluctant to comment on the content of the in-itself of an object, Heidegger attempts to break the barrier.
The concept of authenticity is at first problematic. It argues that there is something within the essence of Dasein that represents the truer essence of Dasein; it is the essence of essence. Yet at the same times, Heidegger argues, "inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a "lesser" being or a "lower" degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure." (p. 40) There is nothing inauthenticate of inauthenticity. Therefore, authenticity is a misnomer. Understood properly, authenticity and inauthenticity are merely two states of the essence of Dasein -- the ground and the excited states.
Dasein transcends Dasein averageness, the everyday indifference of Dasein, or roughly in Sartre's term, Abschattung. I hence have raised question to another of Heidegger's term, Dasein's averageness. Averageness, because it is immediate, is not the reflected average of anything; it is a realization of the possibilities of Dasein. (However, Heidegger directly objects this later. Is his objection effective? How could the ontic of averageness indeterminate?)
[MacQuarrie & Robinson henceforward. Pagination German original.]
Heidegger rejects the Abschattung notion of average everydayness. Dasein's characters of Being are defined as existentialia, while other characters of Being that are not Dasein, categories.
I.2
Dasein's being rests on the being-in-the-world. Being-present-at-hand resides in something that is likewise present-at-hand. Categorial exhibit themselves as being-present-at-hand-along-with. Being-in, being existentiale, is not an entity which is present-at-hand.
Chinese translation
It is quite unfortunate to translate being into 存在. This is of course really challenging for the translator, as there is no "is" in Chinese to predicate being, but 存在 is simply wrong. Unless it is revisionary. In the sense we attribute a new meaning to the term 存在; this is acceptable albeit anti-intuitive.
A couple advices before you decide to read this not so short note. First, this is a reading note and therefore I am unable to know ex ante Heidegger's response. If you have completed Being and Time, this note might be of little help to you. You might find in later chapters Heidegger has written compelling arguments against my criticism. I will however reconsider these comments as I move along the book and I will put these revisionary thoughts in brackets next to the original comments.
Second, I will at times utilize Hegel's nomenclature when I see fit. Familiarize yourself with Hegel's Phenomenology is helpful to understand my Notes and more importantly Being and Time. I haven't read Heidegger's critique on Phenomenology, so by employing Hegel I have primed myself with Hegellian predispositions that Heidegger might be against. However, since I am reading both interchangeably, I think it is heuristically plausible to contrast them for my own synthesis.
Heidegger's Synopsis
Heidegger's own outline is helpful to grasp the big picture of his project and is hence reproduced without minor adjustment.
Since Heidegger's criticism to Aristotle, Descartes and Kant is less engaging for me, I will only discuss the first part of the book for the moment.Part One: The interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being.
1. The preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein;
2. Dasein and temporality;
3. Time and being.
Part Two: The interpretation of Dasein on the basis of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the question of being
1. Kant's doctrine of the schematism and of time, as preliminary stage of a temporality;
2. The ontological foundation of Descartes' cogito sum and the incorporation of medieval ontology in the problem of the res congitans.
3. Aristotle's treatise on time as a way of discerning the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology.
Introduction
A side note of Heidegger's terminology before we dig deep into the brilliant introduction.
- Ontic vs. Ontological. Heidegger makes the distinction between ontic and ontological. We are starting from the ontic, the ordinary everyday experience of phenomena, in search for their ontological meaning. In Hegel's terms, ontic object is perceived by consciousness immediately though sense-certainty, while its ontological is its essence, what is in itself.
- Existentiell vs. Existential understanding. (pp.10-11) This distinction of understandings comes from our differentiation of the ontic and the ontological. According to Heidegger, the ontic perception of Dasein is existentiell while the analysis of its constitution is existential. Again, this technicality follows the Hegellian phenomenology tradition.
Sec. Int. I
What is the meaning of being? This is the core question motivating the writing of Being and Time. The most important thing in this part is of course Heidegger's contextualization of the understanding of being and how Dasein fit in the big picture. The justification for the importance of the question as well as the call for a formal structure of the question of being are self-explanatory. What is really noteworthy is Heidegger's abstraction of Dasein.
So what is Dasein? (p. 10) Once we ask ourselves the question, we immediately realize the tension within it, for "is" predicts the understanding of the being of Dasein? This sounds much like a contradiction: Dasein, by our construction, is a being of beings, without a proper understanding of being, how do we make sense of the question that asks for the being of a being? However, this objection is exactly to the point but not so much an objection. For Dasein is merely ontic at the beginning of our investigation; it is the ordinary everyday understanding of the ways human beings behave. Therefore, the question asks for the determinate meaning of being of Dasein is an understanding of Dasein, for "[t]he ontic distinction of Dasein lies in the fact that it is ontological."
Let's do remind ourselves that Dasein is merely an exemplary being. While the understanding thereof takes ontic-ontological priority, it is no substitution for the understanding of being. We will need to return to the motivational question once we grasp the essence of Dasein.
Sec. Int. II
Here Heidegger introduces the idea of preontological between ontic and ontological. This distinction is awkward but necessary. Inwood has a remarkable exegesis of the concept:
Hegel reiterates my concern earlier that the analysis of Dasein, even assuming fruitful, is "not only incomplete but at first also preliminary." (p. 15) This exactly the reason to employ the term preontological. The analysis of being only brings out the being of Dasein without understanding its essence (this is the ontology of the being, or the ontology of the being of this being).Dasein, unlike other entities, understands the being of beings. But if "ontology" is reserved for a theoretical, conceptual inquiry into being, it is better to say that Dasein is "pre-ontological, i.e., it has an implicit, pre-conceptual understanding of being. Dasein thus has three tiers: 1. It engages with entities ontically, acquiring ontical knowledge of them. 2. It can only do this because of its preontological understanding of being. 3. As a philosopher it may atain a conceptual understanding of being, based on 2.
Inwood, A Heidegger dictionary, p.147."
For Dasein is merely the Immediate impression of being, it is necessarily temporal. This leads us to a doubt of Heidegger's method. For any of our conclusions of Time is caused by the temporal existence of Dasein. Yet Time is ontically a being, how could Heidegger treat Being and Time as two different and fixed ontological entities? Are we mislead by a wrong exemplar being? This doubt is justified but does not cause a problem for our inquiry. As we have argued that our analysis of Dasein is necessitated by its ontic-ontological priority, we are prepared to accept such misconceptions. This is another reason to make a transcendental move from Dasein to being, once we have completed our analysis of Dasein.
After a brief introduction of the idea of Dasein as a being-in-time, Heidegger seems to get himself carried away by his own brilliance. He takes the order to criticize Aristotle, Bergson, Descartes and Kant and finally comes to a critique of phenomenology. However, Heidegger's discussion of phenomenology is superficial; it doesn't touch on the necessity of dialectical phenomenology.
Heidegger argues there is possibility that things show "themselves as they are not in themselves." (p. 29) However, this is merely a fanciful Abstract. The in-itself emanates all its appearances from itself; all phenomena of it, the for-an-others of this in-itself, consequently inherit the same in-itself. Heidegger's misconception is rooted in his confusion of dialectic as the necessary course of consciousness to realize itself. He fancifully assumes that he could start from the other end of the chain. However, this assumptions is merely a concoction of consciousness. The in-itself, assuming consciousness stumbles upon it, exists first for consciousness merely as an ordinary phenomena.
To see this erroneous understanding clearly, let's consider Heidegger's example of "appearances or symptoms of illness." He argues, "What is meant by this are occurrences in the body that show themselves and in this self-showing as such 'indicate' something that does not show itself." (p.25) The appearances are symptoms; the in-itself of the appearances is by construction not illness. Heidegger thinks by this he has come up with an example where appearances come from the thing that is not in-itself. However, the appearances of illness, if not coming from illness, must come from some place else; we can call this the source. The source is the in-itself of the appearances; illness is merely an irrelevant semblance. As consciousness works from such appearances, it realizes the appearances come from the source, its in-self, which is not illness. Hence, Heidegger's example cannot stand.
Heidegger takes a wrong turn but nonetheless arrives at my position. "Ontology is possible only as phenomenology." (p. 51) The discussion of logos, albeit interesting, is unnecessary; it complicates otherwise more lucid reasoning. I agree with the theorization of the phenomenology as hermeneutics. In fact, I have proposed earlier elsewhere the parallels of phonomenolgy and the linguistic procedure of providing a definition.
A last word before I end my note on the introduction. Since Time is a big issue for Heidegger, I will discuss it in detail in the coming sections. However, Heidegger's introduction of being in time up to this point is quite mundane, for the essence of being as Hegel demonstrated is becoming. Hence, being has already incorporated time in itself. Does this completely reject time as a different ontological entity from being? I am not sure. But I'll certainly think more about it as I move into the next a few parts. Heidegger has established himself as a gifted writer, the best I have ever read in term of clarity, and a lucid thinker, but there is nothing groundbreaking up to now.
Pt. 1 Dvn. 1Pure Being and pure nothing are, therefore, the same. What is the truth is neither being nor nothing, but that being — does not pass over but has passed over — into nothing, and nothing into being. But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has equally immediately resolved itself.
Hegel, Science of Logic, §134.
Outline. Ch. 1 sets up the preparatory existential analytic of Dasein. Ch. 2 analyzes the structure of being-in-the-world. Ch. 3 deals with the world in its worldliness. The remaining chapters talk about being-in-the-world as being a self and being with others (ch. 4), being-in as such (ch. 5) and the existential meaning in care (ch. 6). Remember the existential is merely the a priori, the in-itself of the existentiell.
Ch. 1.
"The 'essence' o this being lies in its to be." (p. 39) Unclear; translator has it: that it has to be. Also true: "The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence." (p. 40, emphasis removed) He begins to anthropomorphize Dasein. Phenomenology is reluctant to comment on the content of the in-itself of an object, Heidegger attempts to break the barrier.
The concept of authenticity is at first problematic. It argues that there is something within the essence of Dasein that represents the truer essence of Dasein; it is the essence of essence. Yet at the same times, Heidegger argues, "inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a "lesser" being or a "lower" degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure." (p. 40) There is nothing inauthenticate of inauthenticity. Therefore, authenticity is a misnomer. Understood properly, authenticity and inauthenticity are merely two states of the essence of Dasein -- the ground and the excited states.
* *
*
*
[MacQuarrie & Robinson henceforward. Pagination German original.]
Heidegger rejects the Abschattung notion of average everydayness. Dasein's characters of Being are defined as existentialia, while other characters of Being that are not Dasein, categories.
I.2
Dasein's being rests on the being-in-the-world. Being-present-at-hand resides in something that is likewise present-at-hand. Categorial exhibit themselves as being-present-at-hand-along-with. Being-in, being existentiale, is not an entity which is present-at-hand.
Chinese translation
It is quite unfortunate to translate being into 存在. This is of course really challenging for the translator, as there is no "is" in Chinese to predicate being, but 存在 is simply wrong. Unless it is revisionary. In the sense we attribute a new meaning to the term 存在; this is acceptable albeit anti-intuitive.
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