cjtramell
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[Developing...]
I find reading Heidegger less than gratifying intellectually. It is sad to see Heidegger breaks away from the German idealism tradition and wanders alone into the uncharted territory of an objective Dasein. So I have decided to start Sartre's Being and Nothingness instead. The reading note is based on Barnes' translation. Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1966.Being and nothingness; an essay on phenomenological ontology. New York,: Washington Square Press.
You are recommended to read my previous reading note to have a better understanding of what I am doing.
A brief comment on the text. Sartre is not quite as articulate as Husserl or Heidegger. He could at times jump to a tangent idea without making necessary logic bridge. This is stimulating of course, but it could also get quite confusing. However, the comparison assumes the competence of their translators.
Introduction
Int. I
The first difficulty of Sartre is his own nomenclature. Interior and exterior are roughly the in-itself and the for-an-other in Hegel's terms. Sartre argues at the outset, "The appearances which manifest the existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and non of them is privileged." (p. 3) This is nothing new to Hegel, for the in-itself is perceived by consciousness as an ordinary object; there is no difference from the perspective of consciousness (as if there is any other way). However, Sartre is opening is a strong opposition to Heidegger, who famously argues the phenomena could be appearances not in themselves, whatever that means. (You can read my previous reading note to see my criticism.) Sartre and I have the same stance: "The appearance refers to the total series of appearances and not to a hidden reality which would drain to itself all the being of the existent." (p. 4) In other words, all being is authentic to its in-itself, using Heidegger's terms. The phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of itself." (p. 4) Brilliant, uncompromisingly brilliant.
Sartre makes a quick move to the dualism of finite and infinite. He argues, "the existent in fact can not be reduced to a finite series of manifestations since each on of them is a relation to a subject constantly changing." (p. 5) Sartre hence has redefined the phenomenon before him as a single Abschattung. The single subject presents itself to infinite Abschattung. This new dualism is fine but not particularly interesting, for it is not the Abschattung that we are interested in, but the source of it. Sartre's new model seems quite unnecessary if through each Abschattung we would be able to get the same in-itself. Sartre is picking up again on the subject-object model which phenomenology has rejected. We are forced to proceed with Heidegger's perspective which starts from the in-itself, rather than Hegel's consciousness.
It remains unclear the importance of shifting our perspective, especially after we have argued for the necessity of phenomenology. Sartre's main point is that the phenomenon reveals itself as a thing in-itself only in that respect. To understand the totality of the in-itself, we need to transcend the finitude of each Abschattung.
Int. II
This section deals with the difference between the phenomenon of being and the being of the phenomenon. Let's consider the latter first, for it is the standard setup of phenomenology -- we move from the phenomenon to its being. Sartre departs from Hegel. He argues, "the essence is not in the object; it is the meaning of the object, the principle of the series of appearance which disclose it." (p. 8) However, this barely makes sense. An object, perceived as one that is not consciousness, must has an it-self. According to Hegel, this it-itself is the essence. Having established the object as the Abschattung, Sartre suggests the Hegelian essence is not enough; it is merely an aspect of the in-itself. Dialectic dictates Sartre must be right and Hegel concedes the essence is only the essence for that specific consciousness. However, Sartre gets himself into an ontological abyss when we ask ourselves where is the essence of the object. Our options are limited: there are only two metaphysical entities, the object and the consciousness that perceives it. If the essence of the object, as Sartre argues, is not in the object, it must be in the consciousness. However, this is nonsensical, as we run exactly into the situation Kant rejected out of hand, an object without an in-itself.
Sartre maintains, "the passage from the particular object to the essence is a passage from homogenous to homogeneous." (p. 7) This is quite confusing. What does it mean to say the essence is homogeneous?
We then consider the first part of the question, the phenomenon of being. Sartre asks two questions to further motivate this investigation:
- Is it[the passage from the particular object to the essence] the same for the passage from the existent to the phenomenon of being?
- Is passing beyond the existent toward the phenomenon of being actually to pass beyond it towards its being, as one passes beyond the particular red towards its essence?
The problem of Sartre and Heidegger is that they stray from the German idealism tradition and fancifully assume consciousness could get out of itself and observe the phenomena from their behind. We need to remind ourselves that phenomenology, or according to Hegel philosophy in general (See Philosophy of History), starts and ends in consciousness.
We need yet to clarify the terminologies before we could satisfactorily address the two questions Sartre poses -- the object, the existent, existence, essence, being, noumenon, appearance, phenomenon, being of phenomenon, phenomenon of being. The difficulty to correctly understand these words lies in that fact that Sartre blends in jargons from two opposing schools -- idealism and realism. Kant's noumenon is a thing that is only in itself. Noumenon cannot be perceived by consciousness; it exists in its own universe. The existent are all things that exist in themselves; of which noumenon is a subset. Both of them make sense only in a non-phenomenological (e.g., objectivism) setting. Appearance and phenomenon are the same thing but the latter stresses the irresolution of its in-itself. The appearance presupposes the existent, for it is the appearance of the existent while the phenomenon fronts consciousness directly. Being, being of phenomenon, phenomenon of being are Heidegger's legacy and I do not to attempt to explain them in one sentence myself at this moment. Joseph Catalano made a bold attempt.
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I of course invite constructive criticism and germane response. I understand Chinese, so write your comments in Chinese is fine for me. But you have to excuse me as I am not fluent in typing Chinese. I will respond to your comments collectively in here. *
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