书名: The Concept of Mind: 60th Anniversary Edition
作者: Gilbert Ryle (Author), Julia Tanney (Commentary)
出版社: Routledge; 1 edition (May 29, 2009)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0415485479
ISBN-13: 978-0415485470
Book Description
First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind is one of the classics of Twentieth-Century philosophy, influential and controversial in equal measure. Described by Ryle himself as a ‘sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work’ on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical attempt to jettison once and for what Ryle called ‘the ghost in the machine’: Descartes’ argument that mind and body are two separate entities.
Ryle argues that the language traditionally used to describe the relationship between mind and body amounts to nothing less than a massive ‘category mistake’. Terms such as ‘mind’, ‘thought’ and ‘belief’ do not refer to a mysterious, inner world but simply describe certain actions and our ability to perform them. Even the act of imagining, argues Ryle, should be understood as an outward rather than inner performance, as when we watch a boxer shadow-boxing an imaginary opponent before entering the ring. On this basis Ryle overturns some long-held assumptions about language and knowledge, including knowledge of other people’s minds and launched the new movement of philosophical behaviourism.
Ryle builds his case via an erudite and beautifully written account of the will, emotion, self-knowledge, sensation and observation, imagination and the intellect. Some of the problems he tackles, such as the distinction between ‘knowing how and knowing that’, challenged some of the bedrock assumptions of philosophy and continue to exert important influence on contemporary philosophy.
A classic work of philosophy and psychology, The Concept of Mind is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of the mind and human behaviour. This Sixtieth Anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney. Together with the reissue of both volumes of Ryle’s Collected Papers, it provides essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today.
Review
‘This new edition of Ryle’s classic work, with a substantial critical study by Julia Tanney, will make possible a re-assessment of Ryle and of the revolutionary potential of The Concept of Mind. Tanney’s essay challenges every aspect of the familiar conception of Ryle’s thought, and shows that his ideas, properly understood, reveal fundamental problems within contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Ryle’s approach to philosophy of mind is, she claims, not even one which we have room for in our usual understanding of what the “possible positions” are in philosophy of mind. Tanney’s treatment of Ryle is complex and subtle, and opens up important new ways of thinking in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.’ -- Cora Diamond, University of Virginia, USA
About the Author
Gilbert Ryle was born in England in 1900, one of ten children. In 1924 he was appointed to a lectureship at Christ Church College, Oxford where he was to remain for his entire academic career until his retirement in 1968. In 1945 he was elected to the Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy. He was editor of the journal Mind from 1947 to 1971. He died on 6 October 1976 at Whitby in Yorkshire after a day's walking on the moors.
Julia Tanney is Senior Lecturer of Philosophy at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the Universities of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne.
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作者: Gilbert Ryle (Author), Julia Tanney (Commentary)
出版社: Routledge; 1 edition (May 29, 2009)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0415485479
ISBN-13: 978-0415485470
Book Description
First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind is one of the classics of Twentieth-Century philosophy, influential and controversial in equal measure. Described by Ryle himself as a ‘sustained piece of analytical hatchet-work’ on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical attempt to jettison once and for what Ryle called ‘the ghost in the machine’: Descartes’ argument that mind and body are two separate entities.
Ryle argues that the language traditionally used to describe the relationship between mind and body amounts to nothing less than a massive ‘category mistake’. Terms such as ‘mind’, ‘thought’ and ‘belief’ do not refer to a mysterious, inner world but simply describe certain actions and our ability to perform them. Even the act of imagining, argues Ryle, should be understood as an outward rather than inner performance, as when we watch a boxer shadow-boxing an imaginary opponent before entering the ring. On this basis Ryle overturns some long-held assumptions about language and knowledge, including knowledge of other people’s minds and launched the new movement of philosophical behaviourism.
Ryle builds his case via an erudite and beautifully written account of the will, emotion, self-knowledge, sensation and observation, imagination and the intellect. Some of the problems he tackles, such as the distinction between ‘knowing how and knowing that’, challenged some of the bedrock assumptions of philosophy and continue to exert important influence on contemporary philosophy.
A classic work of philosophy and psychology, The Concept of Mind is essential reading for anyone interested in the nature of the mind and human behaviour. This Sixtieth Anniversary edition includes a substantial commentary by Julia Tanney. Together with the reissue of both volumes of Ryle’s Collected Papers, it provides essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind and language today.
Review
‘This new edition of Ryle’s classic work, with a substantial critical study by Julia Tanney, will make possible a re-assessment of Ryle and of the revolutionary potential of The Concept of Mind. Tanney’s essay challenges every aspect of the familiar conception of Ryle’s thought, and shows that his ideas, properly understood, reveal fundamental problems within contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Ryle’s approach to philosophy of mind is, she claims, not even one which we have room for in our usual understanding of what the “possible positions” are in philosophy of mind. Tanney’s treatment of Ryle is complex and subtle, and opens up important new ways of thinking in philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.’ -- Cora Diamond, University of Virginia, USA
About the Author
Gilbert Ryle was born in England in 1900, one of ten children. In 1924 he was appointed to a lectureship at Christ Church College, Oxford where he was to remain for his entire academic career until his retirement in 1968. In 1945 he was elected to the Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy. He was editor of the journal Mind from 1947 to 1971. He died on 6 October 1976 at Whitby in Yorkshire after a day's walking on the moors.
Julia Tanney is Senior Lecturer of Philosophy at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the Universities of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne.
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