书名: Kinds of Minds: Towards an Understanding of Consciousness (Science Masters Series)
作者: Daniel C. Dennett (Author)
出版社: Basic Books (August 1997)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0465073514
ISBN-13: 978-0465073511
电子书格式：HTML
Book Description
In Kinds of Minds , philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel C. Dennett provides readers with a fascinating evolutionary perspective on how the human mind came to be. Tracing the development of consciousness from its earliest roots, when primitive animals first gained the ability to respond to their environment, he describes the crucial steps that eventually led to the emergence of self-awareness in humans. Along the way, he grapples with such thought-provoking questions as: What is a mind? What is sentience? Why are our minds different from the minds of animals? Do animals feel? Could a robot ever achieve consciousness?
Profound, illuminating, and completely accessible to the lay reader, Kinds of Minds is a landmark work from one of the most foremost authorities on the subject. It is a crucial addition to the philosophical discussion that began with Descartes' theory, "I think, therefore I am."
Review
"Dennett (Darwin's Dangerous Idea), director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, avers that language is the "slingshot" that has "launched [humans] far beyond all other earthly species in the power to look ahead and reflect." In this brief study, some of which is drawn from notes for the author's various lectures, and which returns him to some of the themes of his controversial bestseller, Consciousness Explained (1991), he explores how the human mind came into existence. Along the way, he investigates such questions as, How does the mind work? Can we know another's mind? Can a woman know what it's like to be a man (and vice versa)? What are nonhuman minds like? Could a robot ever be "conscious"? Philosopher that he is, Dennett continually raises and refines his questions about these and other subjects, attempting to tease us closer to understanding. By the end of the book, he confesses, he has not so much presented answers as found better questions to ask. Though some readers may be put off by Dennett's cocksure tone, others will be rewarded by his witty, intelligible speculation." -- Publishers Weekly
"Dennett's clear essay belies philosophy's reputation for abstruseness, something better confined to insular university departments than let loose in public libraries. A popular but serious writer (Consciousness Explained, 1991, and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, BKL My 1 95), Dennett should easily convey his logic about consciousness to the curious with this companionable inquiry. His key concept to discerning consciousness is "intentionality," defined as the something that something is "about," whether it's a molecule that replicates itself, or a John Doe whose purpose is to elude the police. Somewhere across that spectrum of "aboutness," mind comes into existence--is it with bugs? frogs? dogs? robots?--and with such creatures Dennett illustrates what he theorizes makes a mind. That brings up sentience. Many creatures seem to think, like the dog that identifies its human owner from the universe of humans, but Dennett doubts that it--or any creature without language--can reflect on such an act of identifying. Reading like a one-on-one conversation, this intimately written piece should tap the widespread wonder about consciousness." -- Gilbert Taylor, Booklist
"Dennett wears his philosophical hat in this short volume, based on lectures given at University College, Dublin and Canterbury University (New Zealand). As a result, there is more intellectual gameplay here than late news from the neuroscience front, making for a volume that is sometimes stimulating, but often frustrating. Dennett (Center for Cognitive Studies/Tufts Univ.) is a clever writer and has written insightfully about mind matters in Consciousness Explained (1991) and evolution in Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995). But in assuming the philosopher's stance here he admits to raising more questions than answers. At the same time he introduces into these lectures a welter of specialized languages and theories, including the vocabulary of ontology, epistemology, and a string of associated concepts, such as intentionality; the notion of an agent or doer or a ‘mind-haver’; physical and design stances; associationism, behaviorism, and connectionism (as in neural networks), referred to as ABC learning and so on. To what avail? Simply, it seems, to come to some conclusions about where in the Darwinian scheme of things thinking and consciousness (and self-consciousness) come into being. In the end, Dennett strongly supports the notion that only with language comes thought. Further, we only arrive in the abstract multidimensional world of ideas by means of written language and the ability to extend our intelligence through the artful inventions of culture and its representations in books, computers, and records (our external mental ‘prosthetic’ devices). So nix on intelligent chimps and dolphins, but maybe a kind word for dogs as having been bred to respond to humans. Not a book that will be embraced by animal champions. And not Dennett at his best." -- Kirkus Reviews
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作者: Daniel C. Dennett (Author)
出版社: Basic Books (August 1997)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0465073514
ISBN-13: 978-0465073511
电子书格式：HTML
Book Description
In Kinds of Minds , philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel C. Dennett provides readers with a fascinating evolutionary perspective on how the human mind came to be. Tracing the development of consciousness from its earliest roots, when primitive animals first gained the ability to respond to their environment, he describes the crucial steps that eventually led to the emergence of self-awareness in humans. Along the way, he grapples with such thought-provoking questions as: What is a mind? What is sentience? Why are our minds different from the minds of animals? Do animals feel? Could a robot ever achieve consciousness?
Profound, illuminating, and completely accessible to the lay reader, Kinds of Minds is a landmark work from one of the most foremost authorities on the subject. It is a crucial addition to the philosophical discussion that began with Descartes' theory, "I think, therefore I am."
Review
"Dennett (Darwin's Dangerous Idea), director of the Center for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, avers that language is the "slingshot" that has "launched [humans] far beyond all other earthly species in the power to look ahead and reflect." In this brief study, some of which is drawn from notes for the author's various lectures, and which returns him to some of the themes of his controversial bestseller, Consciousness Explained (1991), he explores how the human mind came into existence. Along the way, he investigates such questions as, How does the mind work? Can we know another's mind? Can a woman know what it's like to be a man (and vice versa)? What are nonhuman minds like? Could a robot ever be "conscious"? Philosopher that he is, Dennett continually raises and refines his questions about these and other subjects, attempting to tease us closer to understanding. By the end of the book, he confesses, he has not so much presented answers as found better questions to ask. Though some readers may be put off by Dennett's cocksure tone, others will be rewarded by his witty, intelligible speculation." -- Publishers Weekly
"Dennett's clear essay belies philosophy's reputation for abstruseness, something better confined to insular university departments than let loose in public libraries. A popular but serious writer (Consciousness Explained, 1991, and Darwin's Dangerous Idea, BKL My 1 95), Dennett should easily convey his logic about consciousness to the curious with this companionable inquiry. His key concept to discerning consciousness is "intentionality," defined as the something that something is "about," whether it's a molecule that replicates itself, or a John Doe whose purpose is to elude the police. Somewhere across that spectrum of "aboutness," mind comes into existence--is it with bugs? frogs? dogs? robots?--and with such creatures Dennett illustrates what he theorizes makes a mind. That brings up sentience. Many creatures seem to think, like the dog that identifies its human owner from the universe of humans, but Dennett doubts that it--or any creature without language--can reflect on such an act of identifying. Reading like a one-on-one conversation, this intimately written piece should tap the widespread wonder about consciousness." -- Gilbert Taylor, Booklist
"Dennett wears his philosophical hat in this short volume, based on lectures given at University College, Dublin and Canterbury University (New Zealand). As a result, there is more intellectual gameplay here than late news from the neuroscience front, making for a volume that is sometimes stimulating, but often frustrating. Dennett (Center for Cognitive Studies/Tufts Univ.) is a clever writer and has written insightfully about mind matters in Consciousness Explained (1991) and evolution in Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995). But in assuming the philosopher's stance here he admits to raising more questions than answers. At the same time he introduces into these lectures a welter of specialized languages and theories, including the vocabulary of ontology, epistemology, and a string of associated concepts, such as intentionality; the notion of an agent or doer or a ‘mind-haver’; physical and design stances; associationism, behaviorism, and connectionism (as in neural networks), referred to as ABC learning and so on. To what avail? Simply, it seems, to come to some conclusions about where in the Darwinian scheme of things thinking and consciousness (and self-consciousness) come into being. In the end, Dennett strongly supports the notion that only with language comes thought. Further, we only arrive in the abstract multidimensional world of ideas by means of written language and the ability to extend our intelligence through the artful inventions of culture and its representations in books, computers, and records (our external mental ‘prosthetic’ devices). So nix on intelligent chimps and dolphins, but maybe a kind word for dogs as having been bred to respond to humans. Not a book that will be embraced by animal champions. And not Dennett at his best." -- Kirkus Reviews
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