书名: Action and Responsibility (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy)
作者: Andrew Sneddon (Author)
出版社: Springer; 1 edition (December 1, 2005)
语言：English
ISBN-10: 1402039964
ISBN-13: 978-1402039966
Book Description
What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions.
Written for:
Professional philosophers, graduate students in Philosophy, upper-year under graduates in Philosophy, with following research interests: action, moral responsibility, individualism/externalism, foundationalism
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作者: Andrew Sneddon (Author)
出版社: Springer; 1 edition (December 1, 2005)
语言：English
ISBN-10: 1402039964
ISBN-13: 978-1402039966
Book Description
What makes an event count as an action? Typical answers appeal to the way in which the event was produced: e.g., perhaps an arm movement is an action when caused by mental states (in particular ways), but not when caused in other ways. Andrew Sneddon argues that this type of answer, which he calls "productionism", is methodologically and substantially mistaken. In particular, productionist answers to this question tend to be either individualistic or foundationalist, or both, without explicit defence. Instead, Sneddon offers an externalist, anti-foundationalist account of what makes an event count as an action, which he calls neo-ascriptivism, after the work of H.L.A. Hart. Specifically, Sneddon argues that our practices of attributing moral responsibility to each other are at least partly constitutive of events as actions.
Written for:
Professional philosophers, graduate students in Philosophy, upper-year under graduates in Philosophy, with following research interests: action, moral responsibility, individualism/externalism, foundationalism
[thread=8417]论坛相关讨论主题[/thread]
