书名: Moral Fictionalism (Lines of Thought)
作者: Mark Eli Kalderon (Author)
出版社: Oxford University Press, USA; illustrated edition (June 16, 2005)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0199275971
ISBN-13: 978-0199275977
Book Description
Non-cognitivists deny that moral judgement is belief but claim instead that it is the expression of an emotional attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivists deny that moral sentences even purport to represent moral reality and so have developed non-standard semantics for moral discourse. Mark Eli Kalderon argues for a version of non-cognitivism that eschews such controversial semantics; morality, he argues, is a fiction by means of which our emotional attitudes are conveyed. His book will be essential reading for anyone working across moral philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of language.
Review
"Do we really believe the moral claims we make, or are we just pretending? In likely the most provocative metaethical book of 2005, Mark Eli Kalderon argues for "hermeneutical" moral fictionalism: our ordinary practice of moral judgement involves a form of make-believe rather than genuine belief ... It is an important original contribution that should be read by all scholars and advanced students of metaethics, and will be of interest to those engaged in parallel debates in other areas of philosophy ... I admire the book greatly ... for its bold originality and creativity, its attention to detail, and its clear argument. It will deservedly invigorate the metaethical debate for some time to come." -- Stephen Finlay, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
About the Author
Mark Eli Kalderon is at Department of Philosophy, University College London.
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作者: Mark Eli Kalderon (Author)
出版社: Oxford University Press, USA; illustrated edition (June 16, 2005)
语言: English
ISBN-10: 0199275971
ISBN-13: 978-0199275977
Book Description
Non-cognitivists deny that moral judgement is belief but claim instead that it is the expression of an emotional attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivists deny that moral sentences even purport to represent moral reality and so have developed non-standard semantics for moral discourse. Mark Eli Kalderon argues for a version of non-cognitivism that eschews such controversial semantics; morality, he argues, is a fiction by means of which our emotional attitudes are conveyed. His book will be essential reading for anyone working across moral philosophy, epistemology, and philosophy of language.
Review
"Do we really believe the moral claims we make, or are we just pretending? In likely the most provocative metaethical book of 2005, Mark Eli Kalderon argues for "hermeneutical" moral fictionalism: our ordinary practice of moral judgement involves a form of make-believe rather than genuine belief ... It is an important original contribution that should be read by all scholars and advanced students of metaethics, and will be of interest to those engaged in parallel debates in other areas of philosophy ... I admire the book greatly ... for its bold originality and creativity, its attention to detail, and its clear argument. It will deservedly invigorate the metaethical debate for some time to come." -- Stephen Finlay, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
About the Author
Mark Eli Kalderon is at Department of Philosophy, University College London.
[thread=20829]论坛相关讨论主题[/thread]
